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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on 
the incidence of skill and educational mismatches of 
African youth and explores the linkages between job 
mismatch and wages, job satisfaction, and on-the-
job search. It uses school-to-work transition survey 
datasets from 10 African countries and controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity, sample selection bias and 
endogeneity problems during the estimation of job 
mismatch. Results show that skill and educational 
mismatches are prevalent in Africa: 17.5% of 
employed youth are overskilled, 28.9% 
underskilled, 8.3% overeducated and 56.9% 
undereducated. Our estimation results reveal that 
overskilling and overeducation are associated with a 
wage penalty and undereducation leads to a wage 
premium. In addition, both overskilling and 
overeducation reduce job satisfaction and increase 
youth’s likelihood of on-job search. Our pseudo-
panel approach also suggests that skill and 
educational mismatches of youth are persistent over 
time and skill-mismatched youth are more likely to 
transition to better-matched jobs than youth with 
inadequate education. Finally, our results show that 
unemployment has a scarring effect for underskilled 
youth and both a scarring effect and a stepping-stone 
effect for overskilled and overeducated youth. The 
findings have important policy implications on how 
to address the persistent skill and educational 
mismatches among employed African youth.. 
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1. Introduction
The past decade has seen a significant increase of the African youth population (15–35 years 
old). Recent projections indicate that Africa will remain the world’s youngest region, with the 
median age of its population under 25 years old and the number of youth expected to increase 
from 454 million in 2020 to 845 million in 2050 and 1.2 billion in 2100  (UN, 2019). At the 
same time, the average educational attainment of African youth population has increased 
considerably. The average net enrolment  in primary, secondary and tertiary education has 
reached 78%, 35% and 10%, respectively, in 2017 compared with 60%, 21% and 5% in 2000 
(UNESCO, 2019). Based on current trends, secondary education completion rates by youth 
aged 20–24 will increase from 42% today to 59% in 2030, representing about 137 million youth 
with secondary education and 12 million with tertiary education (The Montpellier Panel, 2014). 
While African countries can tap into this demographic dividend and the increasing 
share of better educated youth can help the continent bridge its productivity gap, researchers 
and development practitioners have questioned not only the quality of education acquired by 
graduated African youth but also the absorptive capacity of Africa’s labor markets (Monga et 
al., 2019). In fact, although many African countries have allocated considerable resources to 
improve education quality (on average, they have devoted 0.78% of GDP to tertiary education, 
compared with 0.66% in other developing countries (Devarajan et al., 2011), these countries 
continue to exhibit unsatisfactory educational outcomes and their graduates often lack the 
appropriate skills and qualifications required by employers in many industries and sectors. This 
has led to skill and educational mismatches of African youth, whereby graduate youths’ skills 
and qualifications do not correspond to requirements of available jobs (Duncan and Hoffman, 
1981; Sicherman, 1991; Hartog, 2000; Borghans and de Grip, 2000; Allen and van der Velden, 
2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Bennett and McGuinness, 2009). Together with labor market 
rigidities and labor mobility barriers, skill and educational mismatches represent the one of the 
most important costly factors for African labor markets. 
Skill mismatches have potentially adverse effects at both the individual, firm and macro 
levels. At the individual level, high skill mismatches are likely to affect wage salaries, reduce 
job satisfaction and increase the likelihood of frequent job changes (Mincer, 1974; Verdugo 
and Verdugo, 1989; Daly et al., 2000; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Allen and van der Velden, 
2001; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009). At the firm level, the inability to find skilled workers to 
perform required jobs has important repercussions on firm dynamism, productivity and profit, 
global competitiveness, growth and—sometimes—firm survival (AfDB, 2019). In many 
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instances, owing to skill shortages and skill gaps, firms in Africa are forced to fill job vacancies 
that require skilled employees with lower-skilled workers, thereby impeding their productivity 
and profitability. An inadequately educated workforce has been cited among the most 
important obstacles to doing business in Africa, regardless of firm size and sector (AfDB, 
2019). At the macro level, structural skill deficits can lead to a country’s loss of 
competitiveness and exacerbate unemployment problems (Boll et al., 2014). It is estimated 
indeed that only 3 million formal jobs are created annually in Africa (Fox et al., 2013) despite 
the 10–12 million African youth that enter the workforce each year (AfDB et al., 2012). Closely 
related to skill mismatch is the phenomenon of educational mismatch (Duncan and Hoffman, 
1981; Groot and van den Brink, 2000; Hartog, 2000; McGuinness, 2006), which occurs when 
employees work in jobs that nominally require either less (in which case they are called 
“undereducated”) or more (“overeducated”) education than they possess (see Leuven and 
Oosterbeek, 2011, for a survey on the topic).  
Although the debate on the effects of job mismatch is not recent, the empirical evidence 
for developing countries, and in particular for Africa, is sparse, if not non-existent. In 
developed countries, empirical studies suggest that the average incidence of skill and 
educational mismatches is about 29% and 22%, respectively (Groot and van den Brink, 2000; 
McGuinness, 2006; see Cedefop, 2010 for a survey). Most existing studies of youth jobs in 
Africa only cite skill and/or educational mismatches as a cause of higher youth unemployment. 
While these studies recognize that job mismatches are likely to be pervasive and costly for 
African labor markets, either they do not provide supportive empirical facts or they only report 
case study results and anecdotal evidence (World Bank, 2015; Honorati and de Silva, 2016; 
McKenzie, 2017).  
The objective of this paper is to fill this empirical gap by revisiting the empirical 
literature of skill and education mismatches in African countries. A work similar to ours is that 
of Herrera and Merceron (2013) who studied underemployment and job mismatch in sub-
Saharan Africa. Using data from the 1-2-3 surveys conducted in seven West African countries 
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo), Cameroon, Madagascar 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2001 and 2005, they found that  14.8–
25.0% of employed workers aged 15 years and older are undereducated while 20.7–21.3% are 
overeducated. However, their study only covers urban areas and does not focus on youth.  
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on job mismatch in Africa in three 
ways. First, it examines the incidence of skill and educational mismatches of employed  youth 
(aged 15¬–29) from a sample of 10 African countries between 2012 and 2015. Furthermore, 
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the paper discusses the patterns of skill and educational mismatches by country, gender, field 
of study, firm size, sector of activity of employed youth and other relevant characteristics to 
identify common features and group specificities. Second, the paper estimates the key drivers 
of both skill and educational mismatches, accounting for country heterogeneity, endogeneity 
issues and potential measurement errors. Finally, the study examines the effects of skill and 
educational mismatches on wages of employed, job satisfaction, and job change. It finally 
discusses the job mismatch persistence over time and approximates its aggregate effects on 
African economies.  
Our study relates to different strands of literature on job mismatch. First, it relates to 
the Human Capital Theory, which excludes the existence of an over-skilled or overeducated 
workforce in the equilibrium and considers job mismatch as a purely temporary phenomenon 
of maladjustment between a firm’s job requirements and the existing human capital of its labor 
force (Becker, 1993). Under this theory, either the labor demand (firms) will adjust to adapt to 
the available human capital stocks or the labor supply (workers) will not invest in unnecessarily 
high levels of education or undesirable skills. The second theory is the Matching Theory 
(Pissarides, 2000), which also treats mismatch in the labor markets as a temporary phenomenon 
that eventually disappears in the long run because mismatched workers will end up changing 
jobs to improve their match. However, the persistence of skill and educational mismatches in 
most societies has proven difficult for both the Human Capital and the Mismatch theories 
(Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Frenette, 2004; McGuinness and Wooden, 2007). Alternative 
models proposed include: i) the Job Mobility Theory (Sicherman and Galor, 1990; Sicherman, 
1991), which assumes that workers get into overeducated positions because they lack clear 
signals about their productivity and, with more work experience, they will move to better 
matched jobs and step out of the overeducation state; ii) the Job Competition Model (Thurow, 
1975), which assumes that, in a highly competitive labor market, workers always have an 
incentive to invest in more education  and therefore, overeducation is workers’ strategic 
response to compete for scarce better jobs; and, finally, iii) the Assignment Theory (Sattinger, 
1993; Allen and van der Velden, 2001), which hypothesizes that the returns to additional 
investments in human capital depend in part on the match between the worker and the job. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets and 
discusses the characteristics of mismatched youth in the labor markets. Section 3 explains the 
econometric approach adopted in the paper to estimate the drivers of skill and educational 
mismatches, their effects on wages, job satisfaction and on-job search. The estimation results 
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are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses different model extensions. 
Section 6 concludes and discusses key policy implications of the findings. 
 
2. Data and descriptive analysis 
The data used for the analysis are cross-sectional datasets from the School-To-Work Transition 
Surveys (SWTS) carried out by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 10 African 
countries between 2012 and 2015 : Benin, Egypt, Liberia, Malawi, Togo, and Zambia  (2012 
and 2014), Madagascar and Uganda (2013 and 2015), Tanzania (2013) and Congo (2015). The 
surveys are nationally representative of the youth population (15–29 years old) and cover 
employed, unemployed, full-time student and inactive youth. The survey design is similar 
across countries and time, which allows both cross-country and temporal comparisons. The 
data contain a rich set of variables related to family background, educational attainment, 
employment history and current employment status of youth as well as future employment 
prospects of unemployed youth and students. The full sample consists of 64,310 African youth, 
of whom 32,437 are employed (Table 2.1).    
Table 2.1: Sample distribution of youth by country, year, and employment status 
  Sample 
Country Year Total  Employed Unemployed 
Benin 2012 6,917 1,830 5,087 
 2014 4,306 946 3,360 
Congo 2015 3,276 1,139 2,137 
Egypt 2012 5,198 2,625 2,573 
 2014 5,758 1,785 3,973 
Liberia 2012 1,876 908 968 
 2014 2,416 1,379 1,037 
Madagascar 2013 3,300 2,614 686 
 2015 5,044 3,867 1,177 
Malawi 2012 3,102 1,980 1,122 
 2014 3,097 2,103 994 
Tanzania 2013 1,988 769 1,219 
Togo 2012 2,033 1,267 766 
 2014 2,708 1,576 1,132 
Uganda 2013 3,811 2,453 1,358 
 2015 3,049 1,961 1,088 
Zambia 2012 3,206 1,428 1,778 
 2014 3,225 1,807 1,418 
Total 64,310 32,437 31,873 
Source: Authors’ computations based on ILO SWTS data, various countries and years. 
 
We used information contained in the surveys to construct our mismatch variables. Skill 
mismatch corresponds to a situation in which an employed youth, during the period under 
consideration, occupied a job whose skill requirements did not correspond to the youth’s actual 
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or self-perceived skills. However, measuring skill mismatch is particularly challenging because 
not only there is no internationally agreed classification of skills or standard measure of skills 
(ILO, 2018)3 but also different job occupations may require different types of skills, while the 
skills needed for the same occupation might change over time as some skills become obsolete 
(Allen and de Grip, 2011). However, there are three main measures of skill mismatch in the 
literature, each one with its own advantages and disadvantages: direct assessment, employers’ 
assessment and workers’ assessment. Direct assessment approaches are based on questions 
concerning selected types of skills (numeracy, literacy, writing, reading skills, etc.). Workers 
are often given assessment tests designed to directly measure a specific skill or their capacity 
to solve complex problems. Standardized scales of skills can then be derived and individuals 
are then classified as skill mismatched depending on whether the standardized value of their 
skills is above or below some predefined cut-off point4. However, this approach is relatively 
time-consuming and data-demanding as it requires very detailed job and occupation analyses 
and precise skills testing (Allen et al., 2013). Employers’ assessment techniques consist of 
collecting employers’ own perceptions of the skills possessed by their workforce and the skills 
needed by their respective job. Though interesting, these techniques require expensive large-
scale surveys and are based on the fundamental assumption that employers are capable of 
assessing the actual skill level of each of their workers. Finally, workers’ self-assessment 
measures are based on employees’ self-perceived match between their skills and the skills 
needed to perform their job competently. The obvious drawback of this method is that workers 
may tend to overestimate their own skills or those required for their jobs. The main advantage 
of this approach is that it takes into account the heterogeneity of jobs since workers can be 
considered the most knowledgeable person about their own jobs and the spectrum of skills 
needed to perform their work efficiently. The choice of either method is mainly conditional on 
data availability, as none of the above methods has been shown to outperform the others (ILO, 
2018).  
Our datasets only allow us to apply the workers’ self-assessment approach. Despite its 
subjectivity, the approach has been found to produce reliable results on measuring skill 
mismatch (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Green, 2013). Hence, we define skill mismatch 
using self-assessment of employed youth about their skill mismatch. Each employed youth was 
asked the following question: “Do you feel that your education/training qualifications/skills 
                                                          
3 For instance, O*Net lists 35 skills classified into 6 groups, while the ESCO classification of skills considers 
13,485 different skills/competences (ILO, 2018). 
4 For instance, Allen et al. (2013) used 1.5 points above or below zero as their cutting point of skill mismatch.  
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are relevant in performing your present job?” with 3 potential answers of interest:  a) “Yes, I 
feel that they adapt to my job" (we classify the youth as well-matched); b) “No, I feel 
overqualified" (s/he is classified as overskilled); c) “No, I feel underqualified and experience 
gaps in my knowledge and skills and need more training” (s/he classified as underskilled).   
Closely related to the notion of skill mismatch is the concept of educational mismatch 
which refers to the situation where a worker’s level of education does not correspond to the 
required level of education to perform his or her job or when the individual’s field of study is 
different from the required field of study (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). Although sometimes 
used interchangeably, skill and educational mismatches do not refer to the same phenomenon: 
two workers with the same level of education may have completely different levels of skills 
and abilities or the other way around. In addition, while people’s level of education rarely 
changes once they have completed their formal education and have started working, their skills 
can vary substantially during the course of their work lifetime through on-job training, 
experience, self-learning, etc. Hence the need to analyze both types of job mismatch separately. 
To compute our educational mismatch variable, we use the job analysis framework introduced 
by Eckaus (1994). It is a normative approach based on job experts assessment of the educational 
requirements of each occupation group (Capsada-Munsech, 2019). Educational mismatch is 
defined by comparing the actual and the required levels of education using the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (ILO, 2012). Each occupation group is assigned 
a required level of education in accordance with the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED) (UNESCO, 2012)5. A worker is then classified as well-matched if his or 
her highest level of acquired education is equal to the required level of education of his or her 
ISCO group6. S/he is classified as over (under) educated if his or her actual education level is 
greater (lower) than the required education level.  
Figure 2.1 provides the incidence of skill and educational mismatches in the surveyed 
countries. It shows that both skill and educational mismatches are pervasive among employed 
African youth. On average, 53.6% of employed youth considered their skills appropriate given 
the requirements of their current job. This means that around 46.4% of employed youth in the 
                                                          
5 To ensure comparability of education systems across countries, we harmonized the education level as follows: 
no education, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education using ISCED classification.  
6 For instance, if an employed youth occupies a managerial position in his company while having only a secondary 
level education, then s/he is classified as undereducated compared with the requirements of his/her job (having 
a university degree). Conversely, if a graduate youth ends up doing elementary occupations (cleaner, 
housekeeper, fruit picker, etc.), he is labeled overeducated because these occupations only require a primary 
education level. 
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selected countries perceived their skills ill-matched with their jobs: 17.5% feel overskilled and 
the remaining 28.9% experience skill deficits. There is, however, important cross-country 
heterogeneity. The largest shares of well-skilled youth are found in Egypt (62%), Zambia 
(61.9%), and Uganda (59.5%), while employed youth in Madagascar (43.9%), Tanzania 
(45.4%) and Benin (49.3%) display the smallest shares. In all countries but Egypt, the 
proportion of youth with perceived underskilling is greater than that for the overskilled, which 
tends to confirm the hypothesis that youth in Africa experience important skill deficits. 
Underskilling is more widespread in Madagascar (42.5%), Benin (41%) and Liberia (37.3%), 
while in Egypt it concerns only 1.4% of youth. 
In terms of educational mismatch, the education level of only 34.8% of employed youth 
corresponds to the education normally required for their current job, implying that close to two-
thirds of African youth are working with an educational attainment either lower 
(undereducation) or higher (overeducation) than their job requirements. Most young workers 
are undereducated (56.9%) and only 8.3% are overeducated, in contrast with youth from 
developed countries, where overeducation is more pervasive than undereducation. Similar to 
underskilling, undereducation is more frequent than overeducation in the selected African 
countries. In Malawi for instance, about three-quarters of employed youth are undereducated 
while in Zambia, only 24.9% are concerned.  
 
Figure 2.1: Incidence of youth’s skill and educational mismatches in selected African 
countries 
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The relationship between skill and educational mismatches appears imperfect in the 
selected countries (Figure 2.2). For instance, among well-skilled youth, only 34.9% possess 
the right level of education. In 71.9% of cases, underskilled youth are also undereducated while 
only 18.3% of overskilled youth are also overeducated. This fact suggests that the problem of 
job mismatch in Africa is bi-dimensional as it concerns both the quantity of education 
(educational attainment) and its quality (skills and qualification acquired). In addition, these 
preliminary results imply that possessing the required level of education is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for better utilization of skills (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Allen 
and De Weert, 2007; Mavromaras et al., 2010). Accordingly, the question is to identify which 
covariates determine the occurrence of skill and educational mismatches at the same time, and 
which characteristics prevail in determining one or the other form. 
Figure 2.2: Relationship between skill and educational mismatches 
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2.2. Some interesting features emerge. On average, employed female youth are better matched 
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incidence of overeducation is often found to be either not gender-related (Chevalier, 2003) or 
in favor of males (Boll and Leppin, 2014). However, important cross-country differences exist 
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way around. Gender gaps among overqualified youth are more important in Egypt, Togo and 
Tanzania.  
In addition, we also observe that the incidence of skill mismatch is more associated 
with poor education—overskilling (underskilling) is increasing (decreasing) with higher 
education—and appears to decline as the youth move to higher age cohorts, in line with human 
capital theories. Mismatched youth are also more likely to live in rural areas and in bigger 
households. Interestingly, the table suggests that parents’ education and the skill content of 
their jobs are correlated with the incidence of skill and educational mismatches of their young 
children: larger shares of well-matched employed youth are found in families where parents 
are either better educated or work in skilled jobs or both. In terms of employment characteristics 
of the youth, Table 2.2 shows that the incidence of job mismatch is positively correlated with 
poor or precarious working conditions. Youth in vulnerable employment (self-employed, 
working without a contract and/or on short-term contract) or working in agriculture are more 
likely to experience skill deficits and lack the appropriate level of education.  
Regarding the wage salary, well-matched workers earn on average more than 
mismatched youth whereas underskilled are better remunerated that overskilled, in support of 
mismatch models that predict a wage penalty for overskilled workers and a wage premium for 
underskilled (Bauer, 2002; Verhaest and Omey, 2006, 2012).  Furthermore, better skills and 
education attainment are positively correlated with the firm size, implying that large firms have 
better chances to attract or easily identify well-matched workers in the labor markets. Indeed, 
the proportion of youth with well-matched skills increases from 52% in firms with less than 10 
workers to 62.5% in firms with 10–49 employees and up to 74.5% in large firms with more 
than 500 workers. A similar pattern is observed with the educational mismatch.  
Finally, skill mismatches appear to be negatively correlated with the degree of job 
satisfaction: the higher the incidence of skill mismatch, the lower the likelihood of being 
satisfied by the job (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Johnson and Johnson, 2002; Florit and 
Lladosa, 2007). However, this association is not clear when it comes to educational 
mismatches. Indeed, while the incidence of overeducation is negatively associated with the 
level of job satisfaction, youth become more satisfied as the incidence of undereducation 
increases, suggesting that skill and educational mismatches might have heterogeneous effects 
on job satisfaction. 
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Table 2.2: Differences in employed youth characteristics by type of skill and educational 
mismatches 
Characteristic Skill mismatch  Educational mismatch 
 Well-
matched 
Overskilled Underskilled  Well-
matched 
Overeducated Undereducated 
Personal characteristics        
Gender        
             Male 53.04 14.06 32.89  31.64 7.01 61.34 
             Female 53.84 20.54 25.62  37.04 9.49 53.47 
Marital status        
             Married 53.09 12.37 34.54  29.02 6.11 64.87 
             Single 53.18 21.33 25.49  40.79 10.80 48.41 
Education        
             No education 53.02 6.56 40.43  - - 100.00 
             Primary education 55.11 10.81 34.08  15.64 - 84.36 
             Secondary education 53.65 29.59 16.76  75.16 14.18 10.66 
             Tertiary education 58.43 35.45 6.11  47.74 52.26 - 
Field of study        
             General programs 57.56 20.46 21.98  22.22 2.78 75.00 
             Education 64.22 16.82 18.96  21.14 5.69 73.17 
             Arts & Literature 51.85 31.48 16.67  33.33 - 66.67 
             Social sciences 58.16 30.86 10.98  26.01 8.07 65.92 
             Sciences, Math, ICT 61.99 23.39 14.62  29.17 6.30 64.57 
             Engineering 62.94 23.86 13.20  46.09 18.26 35.65 
             Agriculture 66.67 21.74 11.59  38.64 15.91 45.45 
             Health 54.09 27.24 18.68  53.33 20.00 26.67 
             Other services 47.96 9.92 42.12  33.33 8.57 58.10 
Age 22.85 22.51 22.43  23.20 23.31 22.68 
Age groups        
             Between 15 & 29 years 50.92 17.56 31.51  28.57 6.50 64.93 
             Between 20 & 24 years 52.42 19.62   27.97    38.26 9.52 52.22 
             Between 25 & 29 years 56.06 16.62 27.32  35.67 8.87 55.46 
Age of first marriage 17.38 18.55 16.02  18.85 20.02 15.96 
Number children 1.74 1.58 1.88  1.56 1.40 1.79 
Relation with the head        
             Head 56.25 12.91 30.84  33.27 7.54 59.19 
             Spouse 51.39 10.58 38.03  21.86 4.27 73.87 
             Son/daughter 51.81 19.04 29.14  33.97 8.80 57.23 
Family characteristics        
Household size 5.60 5.68 5.83  5.58 5.54 5.69 
Location        
              Rural 52.19 15.64 32.17  30.87 6.90 62.23 
              Urban 56.00 21.05 22.95  41.78 11.18 47.04   
Father’s education        
              No education 50.34 14.52 35.14  24.81 4.10 71.09 
              Primary education 53.10 17.70 29.20  32.37 6.72 60.91 
              Secondary education 54.86 23.34 21.80  49.11 15.31 35.58 
              Tertiary education 69.19 19.47 11.34  55.78 21.35 22.87 
ISCO skill level of father’s work(a)      
              Skilled work 60.88 24.18 14.93  49.09 14.92 35.99 
              Semi-skilled work 52.10 16.07 31.84  31.42 6.52 62.06 
              Unskilled work 54.88 20.78 24.34  37.07 12.32 50.60 
Mother’s education        
              No education 51.46 16.32 32.23  28.01 5.39 66.60 
              Primary education 52.84 17.30 29.86  35.24 8.23 56.52 
          Secondary education 59.49 23.63 16.88  54.37 18.58 27.05 
              Tertiary education 68.12 21.74 10.14  61.11 23.89 15.00 
ISCO skill level of mother’s work(a)      
              Skilled worker 61.12 31.22 7.66  50.77 13.08 36.15 
              Semi-skilled worker 51.61 14.57 33.82  29.50 6.27 64.23 
              Unskilled worker 56.22 20.08 23.70  40.49 12.13 47.38 
Employment characteristics      
Hourly wage (b) 2.21 1.57 1.70  1.96 1.75 1.41 
Employment status        
              Wage employment 62.16 23.62 14.22  46.60 12.64 40.76 
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               Self-employment 51.71 14.30 33.99  27.23 5.81 66.96 
               Employer 60.28 15.12 24.60  38.48 8.05 53.47 
ISCO skill-level of youth work(a)       
              Skilled work 75.52 13.80 10.68  39.88 - 60.12 
              Semi-skilled work 51.81 17.49 30.70  32.38 4.10 63.52 
              Unskilled work 50.60 18.97 30.43  43.27 36.70 20.03 
Sector        
               Agriculture 47.17 14.33 38.50  26.42 4.14 69.44 
               Industry 58.44 17.90 23.66  39.60 9.82 50.58 
               Services 58.77 20.65 20.57  40.73 11.88 47.39 
Type of contract        
               Written contract 74.90 13.99 11.11    51.13 14.81 34.07 
               Verbal contract 55.78 25.08 19.15  44.91 12.10 42.99 
               No contract 36.84 44.74 18.42  26.09 3.26 70.65 
Duration of contract        
               Less than 1 year 54.83 20.95 24.23  39.38 15.33 45.30 
        Between 1 & 3 years 65.34 19.89 14.77  50.00 16.95 33.05 
               More than 3 years 69.44 11.57 18.98  47.67 11.92 40.41 
STWT duration(c) 18.17 13.81 17.50  13.12 14.42 20.20 
Work experience (d) 2.75 1.67 3.74  1.88 1.08 3.58 
Number of jobs in the past 1.16 1.17 1.05  1.28 1.13 1.16 
Firm size        
               Less than 10 workers 51.86 17.31 30.83  33.43 7.71 58.87 
               Between 10 & 49 62.48 18.29 19.23  44.43 13.06 42.51 
     Between 50 & 499 70.38 17.60 12.02  54.04 15.89 30.08 
               More than 500 74.53 18.58 6.89  53.80 18.44 27.77 
Job satisfaction        
              Very satisfied 67.13 8.87 24.00  33.26 6.90 59.84 
              Satisfied 56.33 15.63 28.04  35.15 7.51 57.35 
              Unsatisfied 40.00 23.62 36.38  35.16 9.77 55.08 
              Very unsatisfied 38.13 29.23 32.64  36.40 13.84 49.76 
Observations 14,697 4,797 7,997  8,323 2,011 13,752 
Notes: (a) ISCO skill levels refer to ILO’s international classification of the required skill content of different occupations 
based on the nature of work performed, the level of formal education attained and the amount of informal on-job training 
received. We put into the skilled work category ISCO major groups 1–3; semi-skilled work concerns ISCO major groups 4–
8; and unskilled work concern ISCO major group 9 (elementary occupation) and armed force occupations (ILO, 2012).  (b) 
Hourly wages are reported in U.S. dollars for comparability across countries. (c) STWT duration refers to school-to-work 
transition in the number of months between the end of formal education and the first professional employment experience. (d) 
Work experience is approximated by the difference between the year of the survey and first year of professional experience. 
For continuous variables (age, age of first marriage, number of children, household size, hourly wage, STWT duration, work 
experience, and number of jobs held in the past), we report means instead of proportions. The proportions are reported in 
reference to each characteristic so that the sum of shares for each characteristic equals 100% (or about 100% due to rounding). 
Source: Authors’ computations based on ILO’s STWT data, various countries and years. 
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
3.1 Model of drivers of skill and educational mismatches 
 
3.1.1  Model specification 
We use a probit-selection multinomial logit model to estimate the likelihood for 
employed youth to be mismatched or not in Africa’s labor markets. This specification allows 
us to jointly account for all potential mismatch outcomes of youth while also addressing the 
problem of sample selection bias given that the outcome variables are only observed when 
youth are employed. As highlighted in the previous section, the datasets contain information 
on different categories of youth (employed, unemployed, inactive, and full-time student) with 
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different socioeconomic characteristics. If these different subgroups of youth are 
systematically and intrinsically different in terms of characteristics, attributes and opportunities 
related to labor markets, then ignoring sample selection problem will lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of drivers of job mismatch. In our case, the two-step estimation 
procedure consists of estimating, in the first stage (selection equation), the probability of being 
employed, and, in the second stage, the likelihood of being mismatched (outcome equation) 
conditional on being employed (Ordine and Rose, 2009).  
Following Gao et al. (2014), our probit-selection multinomial logit model is written as 
follows: 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, observed only if  𝑤𝑖 = 1                                                                                (1) 
Prob(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑤𝑖 = 1|𝑍𝑖 , ) = 𝛬(𝛽𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖) = exp(𝛽𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖)∑ exp(𝛽𝑘′ 𝑍𝑖)𝐽𝑘′=1                                                            (2) 
where 𝛬(∙) is a multinomial log function, 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables 
explaining the outcome 𝑦𝑖 for the ith youth. Specifically, the vector 𝑍𝑖 includes7 the following 
personal and family characteristics: gender, marital status, level of education8 and field of 
study, location, age group, head of the household, parents’ education and employment status 
and the following employment characteristics: youth’s employment status, ISCO skill-level of 
youth job, sector of employment, type and length of current contract, work experience and firm 
size, as well as country and year dummies. 𝛽𝑗 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated; 𝜀𝑖 is 
the error term. In the skill mismatch model, the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 is a categorical variable 
taking values 𝑗 = 1 if the employed youth is overskilled;   𝑗 = 2 if underskilled and 3 if well 
matched (the base category). In the educational mismatch model, 𝑦𝑖 takes the values 𝑗 = 1 if 
the employed youth is overeducated;   𝑗 = 2 if undereducated and 3 if well matched (the base 
category). 
The selection mechanism (being employed or not) is determined by equation (3): 𝑤𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑖′𝛾𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,       𝜇𝑖~(0; 1), 𝑤𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑖∗ > 0  and  𝑤𝑖 = 0 otherwise                             (3)  
while the probability of being employed or not is given respectively by equations (4) and (5): 
                                                          
7 See Table 2. 
8 In the educational mismatch model, we excluded the variable “education level” because it had already been 
accounted for when computing the educational mismatch variables. 
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Prob(𝑤𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = 𝛷(𝑋𝑖′𝛾𝑖)                                                                                                               (4) Prob(𝑤𝑖 = 0|𝑋𝑖) = 1 − 𝛷(𝑋𝑖′𝛾𝑖)                                                                                                       (5) 
where 𝛷(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function;  𝑤𝑖∗ is a latent variable. If  𝑤𝑖∗ > 0, then the observed dummy variable 𝑤𝑖 = 1 and otherwise 𝑤𝑖 = 0. Hence, Prob(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑍𝑖) is observed only if 𝑤𝑖 = 1. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables affecting the 
probability of being employed or not; 𝛾𝑖 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated; and 𝜇𝑖 is 
the error term assumed normally distributed. In the selection equation, we assume that the 
likelihood of being employed depends on personal characteristics (age, gender, marital status, 
location, and being household head), education (level of education attained and field of study) 
and parents’ education (father’s and mother’s level of education), as well as country and year 
dummies. 
3.1.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Equations 1-4 assume that the probability of being in a particular state j is conditional 
only on observed characteristics 𝑍𝑖 which vary between youth, and that the error terms 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 are uncorrelated. They implicitly assume that all youth with the same level of education and 
skills are perfect substitutes in the labor markets and that the assignment of youth between 
employed and unemployed groups is a totally random process. However, as pointed out by 
Chevalier (2003) and Tarvid (2013), in addition to observed factors in 𝑍𝑖, some unobserved 
individual- or job-specific factors might also make the employed youth a better-matched  or 
mis-matched candidate for the job. For instance, ability and personality attributes as well as the 
environment in which the youth was born and or brought up have been found to significantly 
explain mismatch probabilities (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; Chevalier, 2003; Green and 
McIntosh, 2007; Chevalier and Lindley, 2009). Not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
in modelling the drivers of skill and educational mismatches might therefore introduce a bias 
on the estimated coefficients, particularly if the probability of being well- or mismatched is 
highly correlated with unobserved individual characteristics (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tåhlin, 
2009). 
To account for individual-level unobserved heterogeneity (individual effects) 𝜔𝑖, we 
follow Train (2003) and adjust equation 2 as follows: Prob(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑤𝑖 = 1|𝑍𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖) = exp(𝛽𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗)∑ exp(𝛽𝑘′ 𝑍𝑘 + 𝜔𝑖𝑘)𝐽𝑘′=1                                                               (6) 
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where the choice probabilities are now also conditioned on unobserved heterogeneity 𝜔𝑖. 
The simulated log-likelihood function for the probit-selection multinomial logit model 
with unobserved heterogeneity has the following form (Terza, 2002; Train, 2003; Haan and 
Uhlendorff, 2006; Greene, 2006): log𝐿 = ∑ log 1𝑅 ∑ [(1 − 𝑤𝑖)𝑅𝑟=1𝑁𝑖=1 + 𝑤𝑖 ( exp(𝛽𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑟)1 + exp(𝛽𝑗′ 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑟))] 𝛷[(2𝑤𝑖 − 1)(𝑋𝑖′𝛾𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑟)]                              (7) 
where 𝑅 is the number of random draws from the standard normal population. The unobserved 
heterogeneity 𝜔 is assumed to be identically and independently distributed over the youth and 
follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean 𝜔𝜇 and variance-covariance matrix 𝐖, ω~𝑓(𝜔𝜇, 𝑊). We estimate simultaneously the parameters of our probit-selection 
multinomial logit model with unobserved heterogeneity using simulated maximum likelihood 
(Terza, 2002).  
 
3.2 Models of economic effects of skill and educational mismatches 
 
One of the key empirical questions in the mismatch literature is to understand the extent to 
which mismatched workers fare in the labor markets compared with their peers who are well 
matched in terms of skills and education (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Groot, 1993; Kiker et 
al., 1997; Hartog, 2000; Bauer, 2002; Quinn and Rubb, 2006). The outcomes of interest are 
generally the wage, the degree of job satisfaction, on-job search, and unemployment spell 
effects of job mismatch. However, much of the empirical literature is applied to developed 
countries and does not explicitly target youth in African countries. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first empirical exercise to fill this knowledge gap. The following 
section presents our empirical strategy to measure each of the abovementioned potential effects 
of mismatch.  
 
3.2.1 Model of wage effects 
 
Human capital and job competition theories suggest that job mismatch is a purely temporary 
disequilibrium in the labor markets and that the rate of returns to education is uncorrelated with 
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whether or not a worker is well matched to his or her job (Becker, 1975) and that there are no 
returns to over- and undereducation (Thurow, 1975). For these assumptions to hold, both 
theories assume that firms are able to adjust, automatically and without cost, their production 
technology in response to any change in the quality and quantity of labor supply (Dolton and 
Vignoles, 2000). However, as summarized by Bauer (2002), empirical studies consistently 
find, at least in developed countries, that overeducated workers earn less on average than 
individuals in jobs with adequate level of education and that the returns to years of 
undereducation are often negative. 
To estimate the wage effects of mismatch in the labor markets, the standard Mincerian 
model is extended following the Verdugo and Verdugo model (1989). They proposed the use 
of two dummy variables for being overeducated (𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖) and undereducated 
(𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖) and controlled for the actual years of education attained 𝐸𝑖 so that the extended 
Mincerian model of the wage equation (𝑊𝑖) under educational mismatch is then written as: 
 ln𝑊𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                             (8) 
where 𝛽1 captures the returns to years of actual education; and  𝛽𝑟 and 𝛽𝑢 measure the wage 
effects of overeducation and undereducation, respectively; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual 
socioeconomic and job characteristics; and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 and 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 
take the values 1 if the worker is overeducated or undereducated, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
In this case, if wages are solely determined by the actual level of education of workers 𝐸𝑖, then 𝛽𝑟 = 𝛽𝑢 = 0, and the human capital theory will hold. If instead, wages are determined by a 
required level of education, then any additional year of education exceeding the required level 
will become unproductive and the overeducated (undereducated) worker will earn less (more) 
than a similar worker with adequate level of education, implying that 𝛽𝑟 < 0 and 𝛽𝑢 > 0. 
However, as shown in the previous sections, skill and educational mismatches are not 
perfectly correlated and being skill-matched does not necessarily also imply being education-
matched (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; Allen and De Weert, 2007; Mavromaras et al., 
2010). To ascertain to what extent skill mismatch also affects wages of employed youth, we 
augment equation (8) by the measures of youth self-assessment of overskilling (𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖) 
and underskilling (𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖), which take the value 1 if the youth considers him/herself 
overskilled or underskilled, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Hence, our working empirical model 
of the wage effects of job mismatch becomes: 
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ln𝑊𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛿𝑖 + 𝛽𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖+ 𝛽𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                 (9) 
where the superscripts 𝑒 and 𝑠 on the parameters 𝛽 refer to education and skill mismatches, 
respectively. By including both types of job mismatch, we are able to identify which one has 
stronger effects on wages.  
Equation (9) is traditionally estimated using standard OLS techniques. However, OLS 
estimates are biased if the error terms in (9) are correlated with the components of education 
or skill mismatch, which is likely to be the case (Card, 1999; Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Leuven 
and Oosterbeek, 2011). As a result, the estimated coefficients of both skill and educational 
mismatches could be reporting the effects of other unobserved factors that differ by the type of 
mismatch, leading to either a positive or negative bias, depending on the correlation between 𝜀𝑖 and mismatch variables. The model in equation (9) therefore suffers from both sample 
selection and endogeneity problems to be corrected for.  
To correct for both sample selection and endogeneity problems, we apply the following 
estimation procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2010). In the first step, we obtain the inverse 
Mills ratio (𝜆𝑖) from the probit model of the likelihood of being employed or not, using the 
same set of variables as those in equation (4). In the second step, we use the subsample of 
employed youth and estimate equation (9) by the IV-2SLS approach after incorporating 𝜆𝑖. A 
classical test of no sample selection problem can be performed on the estimated coefficient of 𝜆𝑖. In case of evidence of sample selection bias, the standard errors should be corrected for 
first-stage estimation. For the 2SLS method, given that we have 5 potential endogenous 
variables in equation (9)9, we need at least one instrument per endogenous variable to identify 
the models. These instruments should however fulfill two conditions: relevance (high 
correlation between the instrument and the endogenous regressor) and exogeneity (absence of 
correlation between the instrument and the error term in the main regression). The choice of 
the instruments is generally determined by data availability in the surveys and the specific 
objectives of the study. As potential instruments, we decompose the education of the employed 
youth’s father and mother into three components, following the same procedure applied to 
define our educational mismatch variable:  parent’s required education (1 if the parent’s highest 
level of education matches his/her job requirements and 0 otherwise), parent’s overeducation 
(1 if s/he is overeducated and 0 otherwise) and parent’s undereducation (1 if s/he is 
                                                          
9 𝐸𝑖 , 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 , 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 , 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖  and 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖  
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overeducated and 0 otherwise). We applied different tests (overidentification, 
underidentification and weak instruments) to assess the validity of our selected instruments. 
 
3.2.2 Model of job satisfaction effects 
 
Similar to the above wage model, it is also relevant to investigate to what extent the prevalence 
of skill and/or educational mismatches affect job satisfaction of African youth. This is 
particularly important for youth because empirical studies have suggested that job 
dissatisfaction due to mismatch tends to influence both the productivity of the worker and the 
worker’s likelihood of job change (Battu et al., 1999, 2000; Allen and van der Velden, 2001; 
Amador et al., 2012). In the standard economic theory, job satisfaction will depend negatively 
on a worker’s effort and positively on wages, but will also depend on other job- and worker-
specific characteristics (Sloane and Williams, 1996; Souza-Poza and Souza-Poza, 2000; 
Hamermesh, 2001; Florit and Lladosa, 2007). Studies that have included a measure of 
mismatch in job satisfaction models generally find a significant correlation between skill and/or 
educational mismatches and the level of job satisfaction. In particular, Battu et al. (1999) found 
a negative effect of overeducation on both wages and job satisfaction, similar to the results of 
Johnson and Johnson (2002) and Florit and Lladosa (2007) on the effect of skill mismatches 
on job satisfaction. However, using European data, Allen and van der Velden (2001) found 
instead that skill mismatch has a stronger effect on job satisfaction than educational mismatch. 
In the STWT datasets, employed youth were asked the following question: “To what 
extent are you satisfied with your current job?” with the potential rank responses ranging from 
the scale 1 (very satisfied) to 6 (very unsatisfied)10. Due the ordered nature of the job 
satisfaction scores in the surveys, we apply an ordered probit model to estimate the effects of 
mismatch on job satisfaction and account for the endogeneity of mismatch variables. To reduce 
the dimensionality of our dependent variable, we merged scales 2 and 3 on the one hand and 4 
and 5 on the other to get a 4-scale ordered score: 1=Very unsatisfied (base category); 
2=Unsatisfied; 3=Satisfied; 4=Very satisfied11. The empirical model of job satisfaction is 
represented as follows: 
 
                                                          
10 The scales are 1=Very satisfied; 2=Quite satisfied; 3=Satisfied; 4=Quite unsatisfied; 5=Unsatisfied; and 6=Very 
unsatisfied.  
11 We remove from the estimation 179 observations where the youth declared they were  “neither satisfied 
nor unsatisfied”. 
20 
 
𝐽𝑆𝑖∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛃𝟏𝐌𝐢 + 𝛃𝟐𝐗𝐢 + 𝜀𝑖,     with    𝐽𝑆𝑖 = 𝑗   𝑖𝑓   𝜏𝑗−1 < 𝐽𝑆𝑖∗ < 𝜏𝑗 ,       𝑗 = 1, … ,4        (10) 
where 𝐽𝑆𝑖∗ is a latent variable because the econometrician only observes an indicator variable  𝐽𝑆𝑖 in which the youth has evaluated his/her level of job satisfaction by an ordered scale 𝑗. 𝐌𝐢 
is a vector of endogenous mismatch variables (𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖, 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖, 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖  and 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖) defined previously. 𝐗𝐢 is a vector of control variables related to personal and 
employment characteristics. In particular, in addition to personal and employment 
characteristics used in equation (1), we also include in 𝐗𝐢 hourly wage, duration of 
unemployment before current job (1 if more than 1 year; 0, otherwise), employment benefits 
(1 if the youth received employment benefits in current job, 0, otherwise; and the total number 
of employment benefits), youth’s goal in life12, job training (1 if the youth has received a 
training over the last 12 months to improve current work; 0, otherwise), underemployment (1 
if the youth feels underemployed; 0, otherwise)13 and trade union (1 if the youth is member of 
a trade or labor union; 0, otherwise).  𝜀𝑖 is an error term assumed normally distributed with 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0,1). The instruments for 𝐌𝐢 are the same as those used in the wage equation.  Equation 
(10) is estimated using the IV-ordered probit model corrected for sample selection bias 
(Roodman, 2011). 
 
 
3.2.3 Model of on-job search effects 
 
Economic theory predicts that workers who are currently mismatched in their job are more 
likely to search alternative jobs than better matched peers (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; 
Cahuc et al., 2006; Dolado et al., 2009; DeLoach and Kurt, 2018). Allen and van der Velden 
(2001) found for instance that European workers who report skill underutilization in their job 
were more likely to look for alternative jobs than those who reported no underutilization. In 
our surveys, employed youth were asked the following question: “In the last month, did you 
apply for any other jobs to replace your current job?” with a yes-or-no answer. To test the job-
search theory under mismatch in the context of African youth, we estimate a simple 
endogenous job-search model using a IV-probit specification. 
                                                          
12 A categorical variable: 1 if the main objective of the youth in life is to “Find a job”; 2, “Have a professional 
success”; 3, ”Contribute to society”; 4, “Earn a lot of money”; 5, “Raise a good family”; or 6, “Other objectives”. 
13 The underemployment variable was constructed from the following survey question: “Last week, would you 
have worked more overhours if they would have been remunerated?” The worker is then classified as 
underemployed if s/he replied by “Yes” to the question. 
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𝐷𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛃𝟏𝐌𝐢 + 𝛃𝟐𝐗𝐢 + 𝜀𝑖 ,                                                                                                           (11) 
The dependent variable 𝐷𝑖 takes the values 1 if the employed youth has applied for a job and 
0 otherwise. The other variables have been previously defined.  
4. Results and discussions 
 
4.1. Drivers of skill and educational mismatches 
Table 4.1 reports the average marginal effects of the multinomial logit models for the likelihood 
of being job mismatched when accounting for sample selection bias and unobserved 
heterogeneity. The model is estimated separately for skill and educational mismatches. 
Estimation results show that most covariates significantly affect the likelihood of being job 
mismatched in the selected countries. Female youth are more likely to feel overskilled in their 
job than males. Specifically, being an employed female youth is significantly associated with 
an average 1% increase in the likelihood of overskilling. However, similar to findings by 
Chevalier (2003) and Chevalier and Lindley (2009), the probability of both overeducation and 
undereducation is not gender related.  
The level of education of employed youth significantly impacts the likelihood of being 
skill mismatched. The average marginal effects of overskilling (underskilling) are increasing 
(decreasing) as we move from lower to higher educational attainment. Youth with tertiary 
education have a 31.6% more chance of feeling overskilled and a 22.7% less chance of being 
underskilled than youth with lower educational levels. Results also highlight the heterogeneous 
effects of the fields of study during schooling on the probabilities of skill or educational 
mismatches once employed. Self-assessed overskilling is highly probable for youth who 
followed services curriculum, whereas the risk of underskilling is significantly decreasing for 
all the fields of study. Importantly, however, although the subject of study during schooling is 
an important determinant in finding a job, our results show that it does not protect African 
youth against the likelihood of being either overeducated or undereducated. Youth who studied 
Arts & Literature have a significantly lower risk of being overeducated, while general 
programs, engineering, health and services curricula reduce the probability of undereducation.  
Importantly and contrary to job search and career mobility theories, the likelihood of being job 
mismatched does not decline with the age of the employed youth in Africa. In fact, relative to 
youth aged 15–19 (the youngest cohort in the surveys), the probability of being overskilled or 
overeducated is 1.2% and 3.7% higher for employed youth aged 20–24 years old. It increases 
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further to 3% and 8.9%, respectively, for those in the 25–29 age bracket. A similar pattern is 
observed for the marginal effects of being underskilled or undereducated. This implies that the 
probability of finding a better job match in the labor markets does not improve as the youth 
move from younger to older cohorts and that job mismatch might be a rather persistent 
phenomenon for employed African youth (see Section 5.1 below). Another potential 
explanation is the existence of important labor market inefficiencies and failures in Africa 
where search and information costs are often prohibitive. In such a situation, not only does it 
take time for youth entering the labor market to find a better job match but also this mismatch 
is likely to become more prevalent over time.  
There is also a significant relationship between parents’ education and their children’s 
job mismatch status. Parameter estimates reveal that youth coming from more educated 
families have a lower chance of being job mismatched (Ordine and Rose, 2009). Indeed, 
employed youth with tertiary educated parents are less likely to be either over- or underskilled 
and therefore are more likely to be in a well-matched job. On the other side, parents’ education 
has a significantly positive (negative) effect on the risk of overeducation (undereducation) of 
their young children only from the secondary level.  
In terms of employment characteristics, several interesting findings emerge from Table 
4.1. First, relative to other employment statuses, self-employed and wage-employed workers 
and employers are less likely to feel underskilled, with the risk being lower for employers. 
Salary workers have a 1.9% lower chance of being overeducated compared with other 
categories of workers. This finding can be explained by the fact that most self-employed youth 
are in the informal sector, where low and unskilled jobs prevail (Herrera and Merceron, 2013).  
Second, holding other characteristics constant, we expect youth working in higher 
occupation levels14 to experience less skill deficits than youth in lower-skill occupations15. Our 
results partially confirm this theoretical prediction. Youth employed as managers and 
professionals have a better chance of having the appropriate skills for their jobs but 
unexpectedly, they are less likely to be overeducated than undereducated, tending to confirm 
that skill and educational mismatches are not necessarily complementary.  
Third, results show that better skilled youth are more likely to work in secondary and 
tertiary sectors than in agriculture.  
 
                                                          
14 Managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals. 
15 Support, sales, trade workers, elementary occupations, etc. 
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Table 4.1: Multinomial logit estimates for the likelihood of being job mismatched 
corrected for sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity (Average marginal effects) 
 Skill mismatch  Educational mismatch 
 Overskilled Underskilled  Overeducated Undereducated 
Gender (1 if female) 0.010  
(0.005)** 
0.003  
(0.005) 
 0.003  
(0.003) 
-0.009  
(0.006) 
Marital status (1 if married) -0.018 
(0.006)*** 
0.016 
(0.007)** 
 -0.015 
 (0.004)*** 
0.044  
(0.007)*** 
Education (ref: No education)      
             Primary education 0.038 
(0.005)*** 
-0.089 
(0.008)*** 
 - - 
             Secondary education 0.216 
(0.008)*** 
-0.182 
(0.009)*** 
 - - 
             Tertiary education 0.316 
(0.016)*** 
-0.227 
(0.016)*** 
 - - 
Field of study (ref: Other)      
             General programs 0.021 
(0.013) 
-0.075 
(0.014)*** 
 -0.009 
(0.020) 
-0.074  
(0.029)** 
             Education sciences -0.041 
(0.018)** 
-0.074 
(0.024)*** 
 0.002 
 (0.027) 
-0.064  
(0.048) 
             Arts & Literature 0.057 
(0.047) 
-0.056 
(0.064) 
 -0.087 
(0.002)*** 
-0.273  
(0.033) 
             Social sciences 0.030 
(0.019) 
-0.096 
(0.029)*** 
 0.015 
 (0.020) 
0.029  
(0.020) 
             Science, Math, ICT -0.002 
(0.026) 
-0.063 
(0.038)* 
 -0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.033  
(0.051) 
             Engineering -0.015 
(0.022) 
-0.085 
(0.036)** 
 0.022  
(0.020) 
-0.123  
(0.048)*** 
             Agriculture -0.034 
(0.036) 
-0.137 
(0.055)** 
 -0.010 
 (0.041) 
-0.019  
(0.075) 
             Health 0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.064 
(0.026)** 
 0.070  
(0.058) 
-0.178  
(0.107)* 
             Services 0.128 
(0.038)*** 
-0.099 
(0.040)** 
 -0.022  
(0.023) 
-0.131  
(0.057)** 
Age groups (Ref: 15–29 years)      
             20–24 years 0.012 
(0.006)** 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
 0.037 
(0.003)*** 
-0.145 
(0.007)*** 
             25–29 years 0.030 
(0.008)*** 
-0.031 
(0.009)*** 
 0.089 
(0.005)*** 
-0.235 
(0.008)*** 
Relation with the head (1 if head) -0.022 
(0.007)*** 
0.007 
(0.008) 
 -0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.029 
(0.008)*** 
Location (1 if rural) -0.015 
(0.005)*** 
0.010 
(0.006) 
 -0.005 
(0.003) 
0.033  
(0.006)*** 
Father’s education (1 if no education)      
              Primary education 0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
 0.007  
(0.007) 
-0.023  
(0.011)** 
              Secondary education 0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
 0.044 
(0.007)*** 
-0.133 
(0.012)*** 
              Tertiary education -0.040 
(0.013)*** 
-0.043 
(0.020)*** 
 0.084 
(0.011)*** 
-0.159 
(0.019)*** 
ISCO skill level of father’s work (Ref: Unskilled work)      
              Skilled work -0.012 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
 0.013 
(0.006)** 
-0.054 
(0.013)*** 
              Semi-skilled work -0.023 
(0.008)*** 
0.010 
(0.010) 
 -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.005  
(0.009) 
Mother’s education (Ref: No education)      
              Primary education 0.004 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
 0.003  
(0.008) 
-0.004  
(0.013) 
              Secondary education 0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
 0.026 
(0.009)*** 
-0.083 
(0.014)*** 
              Tertiary education -0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.037) 
 0.065 
(0.019)*** 
-0.207 
(0.031)*** 
ISCO skill level of mother’s work (Ref: Unskilled worker)      
              Skilled worker 0.015 
(0.009)* 
-0.000 
(0.017) 
 0.043 
(0.006)*** 
-0.048 
(0.012)*** 
              Semi-skilled worker 0.022 
(0.007)*** 
-0.037 
(0.008)*** 
 0.007  
(0.004)* 
-0.014  
(0.009) 
Employment status (Ref: Other)      
              Wage employment 0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.059 
(0.011)*** 
 -0.019 
(0.005)*** 
-0.004  
(0.010) 
               Self-employment 0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.034 
(0.007)*** 
 -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001  
(0.008) 
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               Employer -0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.069 
(0.014)*** 
 -0.000  
(0.009) 
-0.014  
(0.015) 
ISCO skill-level of youth work (Ref: Unskilled worker)      
              Skilled worker -0.128 
(0.009)*** 
-0.060 
(0.015)*** 
 -0.391 
(0.008)*** 
0.643  
(0.010)*** 
              Semi-skilled worker -0.032 
(0.007)*** 
0.012 
(0.008) 
 -0.328 
(0.008)*** 
0.394  
(0.007)*** 
Sector (Ref: Agriculture)      
               Industry -0.026 
(0.008)*** 
-0.036 
(0.009)*** 
 0.002  
(0.005) 
-0.022  
(0.009)** 
               Services -0.012 
(0.006)* 
-0.038 
(0.007)*** 
 0.029  
(0.004)*** 
0.064  
(0.007)*** 
Type of contract (1 if written contract) -0.059 
(0.012)*** 
-0.060 
(0.018)*** 
 0.038 
(0.007)*** 
-0.113 
(0.014)*** 
Duration of contract (1 if less than 1 year) 0.038 
(0.010)*** 
0.006 
(0.014) 
 -0.004 
(0.006) 
0.011  
(0.013) 
Work experience -0.008 
(0.000)*** 
0.004 
(0.000)*** 
 -0.014 
(0.001)*** 
0.033  
(0.001)*** 
Firm size (Ref: Less than 10 workers)      
               10–49 -0.043 
(0.008)*** 
0.032 
(0.014)** 
 0.034 
(0.007)*** 
-0.043 
(0.012)*** 
               50–499 -0.065 
(0.011)*** 
0.032 
(0.024) 
 0.022 
(0.009)** 
-0.055 
(0.018)*** 
               More than 500 -0.071 
(0.013)*** 
-0.031 
(0.038) 
 0.050 
(0.013)*** 
-0.043  
(0.021)** 
Country dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Predicted probabilities 0.18 0.28  0.09 0.56 
Observations 24,003 24,003  21,180 21,180 
Note: Robust standard errors into brackets. (*), (**), and (***) refer to statistically significant coefficients at least at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 
Being employed in the industry and services sectors decreases by 2.6 and 1.3%, 
respectively, the likelihood of feeling overskilled and by 3.6% and 3.8%, respectively, the 
probability of being underskilled. This is because not only do a larger proportion of firms in 
the industry and services sectors operate in the formal sector but they also face fiercer 
competition, which requires well-qualified workers. In that context, they are more likely to 
develop better screening and recruitment processes, which increases the chances of identifying 
well-matched workers. However, tertiary sector workers are more likely to be both 
overeducated and undereducated, while secondary sector workers have a lower probability of 
being undereducated.  
Finally, the size of the firm where youth are employed significantly affects the 
probabilities of both skill and educational mismatches. In particular, the larger the firm size, 
the lower the likelihood of being overskilled. The average marginal effects of being overskilled 
range from –4.3% when the number of workers is 10–49 to –6.5% for 50–499 workers and –
7.1% for 500 workers and more. This finding can be partly explained by asymmetric and 
imperfect information in labor markets, where larger firms have more resources and better 
selection processes to spot and dismiss mismatched workers. It is also possible that mis-skilled 
youth self-select themselves out of employment in large firms due to very restrictive job 
requirements. Alternatively, larger firms generally have sufficient resources to offer better 
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salaries and employment benefits that attract skilled workers. In terms of educational 
mismatch, findings show that larger firms are more likely to have both better-skilled and 
overeducated youth. Indeed, working in a firm of 10–49 workers increases the likelihood of 
being overeducated by 3.4% but reduces by 4.3% the risk of being undereducated.  
 
4.2. Wage effects of skill and educational mismatches 
Table 4.2 reports the estimation results of the extended Mincerian model to assess 
whether job mismatch leads to a wage premium or instead to a wage penalty for employed 
youth. In Table 4.2, we report the estimation results for 4 different models: a simple pooled 
OLS in model 1, a model with educational mismatch corrected for sample selection bias but 
without endogeneity (model 2), a model with skill and educational mismatches without 
endogeneity but corrected for sample selection bias (model 3) and a full model corrected for 
both endogeneity problems and sample selection bias (model 4). We focus our discussion on 
model 4 because coefficients in models 1 and 3 are likely to be biased due to endogeneity 
problems. All standard tests of the validity and relevance of our excluded instruments support 
our choice of instruments. In particular, the statistically insignificant Hansen J test of 
overidentifying restrictions concludes that our instruments are valid and we cannot therefore 
reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity.  In addition, the Montiel-Pflueger robust 
weak instrument test rejects at 5% the null hypothesis of weak instruments for our 2SLS 
estimation.  
After controlling for personal and job characteristics, country and year effects, results 
in model 4 strongly reject the predictions of the human capital and job competition theories 
that only actual education is important in wage determination (i.e. 𝛽𝑜𝑒 = 𝛽𝑢𝑒 = 0 and 𝛽𝑜𝑒 = 𝛽𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽𝑜𝑠 = 𝛽𝑢𝑠 = 0). In line with the assignment theory (Sattinger (1993), our findings 
reveal that the returns to years of actual education are significantly higher than the wage effects 
associated with educational mismatch, with each additional year of actual education estimated 
to increase the expected wage by 0.61%. Furthermore, estimation results from model 4 suggest 
that overeducated youth earn on average 17.9% less and undereducated 44.8% more than 
employed youth with the same level of education who work in matched jobs, confirming the 
theoretical predictions that overeducation is associated with a wage penalty and undereducation 
with a wage premium. Herrera and Merceron (2013) for African countries, Santos (1995) for 
Portugal and Bauer (2002) for Germany found similar results. As explained by Hartog (2000), 
the negative effect of the overeducation coefficient may imply that overeducated workers are 
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likely employed in lower-level jobs than youth without overeducation. Indeed, descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 2.2 reveal that none of the overeducated youth are employed in 
skilled jobs or hold managerial and professional positions in their work. Finally, only 
overskilling appears to affect wage levels of employed youth: being overskilled generates a 
wage penalty of 6.7% compared with other categories of workers. 
 
Table 4.2: Heckman-corrected Mincerian earning equation: Augmented Verdugo and 
Verdugo model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Years of actual education 0. 134 
(0.028)*** 
0.131 
(0.028)*** 
0.202 
(0.029)*** 
0.609 
 (0.172)*** 
Overeducation (1 if overeducated) -0.070 
(0.049) 
-0.070 
(0.047) 
-0.100 
(0.049)** 
-0.179  
(0.060)*** 
Undereducation (1 if undereducated) 0.134 
(0.037)*** 
0.133 
(0.040)*** 
0.164 
(0.043)*** 
0.448  
(0.126)*** 
Overskilling (1 if overskilled)   -0.078 
(0.038)** 
-0.067  
(0.038)* 
Underskilling (1 if underskilled)    -0.055 
(0.051) 
0.038 
 (0.069) 𝑹𝟐 0.225   0.311 𝑳𝑹 𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 (𝝆 = 𝟎) - 0.51  
(0.477) 
0.76  
(0.384) 
- 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝒐𝒆 = 𝜷𝒖𝒆 = 𝟎 6.91 
(0.001)*** 
14.97 
(0.001)*** 
21.32  
(0.000)*** 
15.05  
(0.001)*** 𝑯𝟎: 𝜷𝒐𝒆 = 𝜷𝒖𝒆 = 𝜷𝒐𝒔 = 𝜷𝒖𝒔 = 𝟎   33.16  
(0.000)*** 
21.30  
(0.001)*** 
Personal and job characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 22,976 22,976 22,976 22,976 
Note: In model 4: Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic for under-identification test: 206.766 (p = 0.000). Sargan 
statistic for overidentification test of all instruments: 7.250 (p = 0.202). Montiel-Pflueger robust weak 
instrument test: 37.651 (p = 0.05). Robust standard errors in models 1–3 and bootstrapped standard errors in 
model 4 with 10,000 replications. (*), (**), and (***) refer to statistically significant coefficients at least at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
4.3. Jobs satisfaction effects 
Table 4.3 reports the estimation results of the effects of skill and educational 
mismatches using an ordered probit model corrected for sample selection bias and endogeneity 
problem. As expected, skill and educational mismatches are significant predictors of the degree 
of job satisfaction of employed youth when we control for education level, job attributes and 
personal characteristics. In particular, our results suggest that, in terms of educational 
mismatch, only undereducation in a current job significantly affects the probability of job 
satisfaction, and its effects are heterogeneous, depending on the extent of job satisfaction. 
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Undereducated youth are more likely to be dissatisfied with their current job and the effect is 
more pronounced as the degree of job satisfaction increases. Indeed, Table 4.3 indicates that 
the average marginal effects of undereducation are positive for job dissatisfaction (0.045 for 
very unsatisfied and 0.037 for unsatisfied youth) and negative for job satisfaction (–0.014 for 
satisfied and –0.068 for very satisfied youth). A potential explanation of this result is that youth 
who have education deficits compared with their peers may feel more deprived and develop an 
inferiority complex that could negatively affect their utility. Alternatively, youth who have the 
required education are more satisfied as they consider that their educational investment has 
paid off as expected (Florit and Lladosa, 2007).  
However, our results show that skill mismatches are better drivers of job satisfaction of 
youth than educational mismatches because both overskilling and underskilling reduce the 
probabilities of job satisfaction. Overskilled youth have 3.4% less chance of being satisfied 
with their current job while satisfied youth are 1.8% less likely to be underskilled. Similar 
findings of the effects of job mismatch have been reported by Green and Zhu (2008) for Britain, 
Amador et al. (2012) for Spain, Allen and van der Velden (2001) for 11 European countries 
and Japan, McGuinness and Sloane (2011) for U.K. graduates and Sánchez-Sánchez and 
McGuinness (2015) for 13 European countries. When youth occupy jobs that they feel 
underutilize their competences and skills, they become less satisfied because, extrinsically, 
they might foresee few career opportunities and, intrinsically, they might feel their 
competences are not as appreciated or leveraged as they should be, leading to resignation to 
their work condition (Peiro et al., 2010). The decreased satisfaction of underskilled youth could 
be instead explained by the fact that they might work under considerable pressure as they 
consistently try to keep up with the skill requirements of a job for which they experience more 
or less important gaps. In a labor market characterized by high unemployment rates, like in 
most African countries, and therefore fierce competition for few available positions, 
underskilled youth might then dread being dismissed due to insufficient skills.  
Finally, our observation that undereducated youth have a lower likelihood of job 
satisfaction while at the same enjoying a wage premium (see Table 4.2) suggests the existence 
of a sort of trade-off between earnings and other nonmonetary aspects of their work, the lack 
of satisfaction being somewhat offset by higher earnings. This trade-off does not seem to exist 
for overskilled youth because they suffer from the double burden of wage penalty and job 
dissatisfaction. These results therefore suggest that both skill and educational mismatches 
should be urgently addressed because they affect both wages and job satisfaction of employed 
youth. 
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Table 4.3: Average marginal effects of skill and educational mismatches on job 
satisfaction: Ordered Probit model with sample selection and endogeneity 
 Degree of job satisfaction 
 Very unsatisfied  Unsatisfied  Satisfied  Very satisfied 
Hourly wage  -0.010  
(0.002)*** 
 -0.009  
(0.002)*** 
 0.003  
(0.001)*** 
 0.016 
 (0.003)*** 
Overeducation (1 if Overeducated) -0.029 
 (0.038) 
 -0.024  
(0.032) 
 0.009  
(0.012) 
 0.044  
(0.058) 
Undereducation (1 if Undereducated) 0.045  
(0.015)*** 
 0.037  
(0.012)*** 
 -0.014  
(0.005)*** 
 -0.068  
(0.023)*** 
Overskilling (1 if Overskilled) 0.112 
 (0.007)*** 
 0.092  
(0.005)*** 
 -0.034  
(0.004)*** 
 -0.169  
(0.010)*** 
Underskilling (1 if Underskilled)  0.061 
(0.008)*** 
 0.049  
(0.007)*** 
 -0.018  
(0.003)*** 
 -0.091  
(0.012)*** 
Personal and job characteristics YES  YES  YES  YES 
Country dummies YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year dummies YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 5,649  5,649  5,649  5,649 
Note: (*), (**), and (***) refer to statistically significant coefficients at least at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. The marginal effects of the dummy variables show the discrete change from 0 to 1. 
 
4.4. On-job search effects 
If skill and educational mismatches affect both the wages and the degree of satisfaction 
of employed youth, do they also have real behavioral consequences in the labor markets, for 
instance pushing youth to look for alternative employment opportunities? Table 4.4 answers 
that question by reporting the results of three different specifications: a model with skill and 
educational mismatches without correction for endogeneity and sample selection bias (model 
1), a model without endogeneity but corrected for sample selection bias (model 2), and a model 
corrected for both endogeneity and sample selection bias.  
Consistent with predictions of on-job search (OSJ) models (Burdett, 1978; Deloach and 
Kurt, 2018), our empirical evidence suggests that mismatched youth are more likely to search 
for alternative jobs than their better-matched peers, irrespective of the estimation method 
chosen. Skill-mismatched and overeducated youth are more likely to look for other jobs than 
are undereducated youth. Specifically, after controlling for other characteristics, we find that 
an additional year of overeducation increases by 0.18% the likelihood of an employed youth 
searching for other jobs while overskilled youth are 0.31% more likely to apply for other jobs 
to replace their current job.  
Possible explanations for these behavioral consequences of job mismatch might 
however diverge, depending on the type of job mismatch considered.  For instance, 
overeducated youth might be frustrated that their investment in education is not paying off as 
expected compared with their peers, in particular if salaries and benefits in their current job are 
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determined by the required rather than the actual level of education. In addition, according to 
the job-searching theories of Johnson (1978) and Jovanovic (1979), asymmetric information 
might prevent workers from perfectly foreseeing the quality of the job match and they may 
therefore accept jobs that turn out not to match their education or skills. Finally, it is plausible 
that overeducated and overskilled youth might fear the depreciation of their human capital 
because of non-use in their current job, resulting in declines in productivity (Rubb, 2006). 
Consequently, these mismatched youth will be more willing to seek alternative positions until 
they find a better job match (Frei and Sousa-Poza, 2012). This explanation is also confirmed 
in the surveys: when asked why they would like to change their current job, 21.9% of 
overskilled youth responded that they wanted to use their skills efficiently, compared with only 
4.6% of underskilled.  
Undereducated youth, on the other hand, are less likely to search for other jobs because, 
despite being short on education, they might feel that they have been lucky to even have a job. 
This explanation is plausible because the prospect of unemployment is daunting and the 
chances of getting a skill-matched or even just a decent job are often low in most African 
countries. Another potential explanation is simply that undereducated youth might be working 
in sectors that include a significant component of specialized vocational and on-the-job training 
that may substitute for the formal education.  This argument is supported by the fact that among 
the undereducated youth in the sample, 56% felt that they have the appropriate skills to perform 
their jobs and 9% of them even described themselves as overskilled. Finally, the explanation 
used to explain job dissatisfaction of underskilled is also valid here for job search: the fear of 
losing their job due to the lack of required skills might push underskilled youth to search for 
better matched jobs. 
 
Table 4.4: Average marginal effects of skill and educational mismatches on the 
likelihood of job search: IV probit model with sample selection and endogeneity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years of overeducation 0.007 
(0.003)** 
0.013 
(0.003)*** 
0.178 
(0.083)** 
Years of undereducation -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.002)*** 
-0.024 
(0.007)*** 
Over-skilling (1 if overskilled) 0.102 
(0.013)*** 
0.116 
(0.014)*** 
0.308 
(0.089)*** 
Under-skilling (1 if underskilled)  0.025 
(0.018) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.120 
(0.070)* 
Predicated probability: 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐛 (𝑫𝒊 = 𝟏) 0.228 0.237 0.234 
Personal and job characteristics YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
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Observations 5,249 5,249 5,249 
Note: In model 3: Wald test of exogeneity (corr = 0): chi2(1) = 2.31, Prob > chi2 = 0.1288. Robust standard 
errors in models 1 and 2 and bootstrapped standard errors in model 3 with 10,000 replications. (*), (**), and (***) 
refer to statistically significant coefficients at least at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. [ ] refers to p-values.  
 
5. Model extensions 
 
5.1. Persistence of mismatches over time 
Previous sections have shown that skill and educational mismatches are pervasive among 
African youth. If job mismatches are only temporary disequilibrium in the labor markets, then 
short-term government interventions may suffice to address the problem. If instead, job 
mismatch is more persistent over time, then more structural policy actions will be needed. To 
understand whether skill and education mismatches are transitory phenomenon or rather a more 
persistent state in Africa, we computed transition probability matrices of employed youth.  
In the absence of longitudinal data, we constructed pseudo-panel data of employed 
youth for each of the two survey years and excluded countries with only one survey round 
(Congo and Tanzania) 16. The pseudo-panel approach has been widely applied in the 
econometric literature to estimate mobility across different states over time, such as mobility 
across employment status, occupations and poverty dynamics, with the assumption that 
individuals within the same cohort not only share the same observable characteristics but also 
have the same likelihood of being well matched or mismatched in the labor markets (Lanjouw 
et al., 2009; Verbeek and Nijman, 1992; Deaton, 1985). According to Deaton (1985) and 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992), a cohort represents a group of individuals assumed to be 
homogeneous and who are followed over the observed period so that the dynamism of the 
phenomenon under study is evaluated for each cohort. Despite its drawbacks, the cohort 
approach has gained popularity among developing countries’ researchers due to the lack of 
long-panel data.  
Before constructing our pseudo panel dataset and ensuring its reliability, two important 
issues have to be addressed: temporal cohort stability and measurement error bias. The first 
issue consists of establishing cohort stability over time. To ensure stability, Deaton (1985) 
proposes the use of time-invariant characteristics when creating cohorts. The underlying idea 
                                                          
16 This means for the remaining 8 countries, there is a 2-year gap between the 2 surveys: between 2012 and 
2014 for Benin, Liberia, Togo, Zambia, Egypt and Malawi and between 2013 and 2015 for Madagascar and 
Uganda. 
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is that the more time-invariant variables we include when constructing cohorts, the closer the 
characteristics of the constructed pseudo panel will become to those from genuine panel data. 
In the present study, we defined youth cohorts using the country of residence, the birth 
generation17, the gender and the highest level of education attained by employed youth. Such 
choice represents an important trade-off between the need to have a sufficient number of 
individuals per cohort and the desire to have a large number of cohorts. Indeed, the greater the 
number of cohorts, the fewer the number of observations per cohort, therefore the greater the 
potential error in estimating the cohort mean. 
The measurement error bias represents the second important problem to be addressed 
because it affects the consistency of the pseudo panel estimators. The bias occurs when the 
sample means deviate from the true cohort means in the population, resulting in biased OLS 
estimation.  The acuity of this problem will mainly depend on the sample size and the skewness 
of the mean.  Hence, the smaller the sample size (number of observations per cohort and/or 
number of cohorts) and the more skewed the mean by extreme numbers, the greater the risk of 
measurement error. Two solutions are generally proposed to deal with this problem: the use of 
error-in-variable estimators or a within estimator. However, according to Verbeek and Nijman 
(1992), the condition to ignore the measurement error problem is to construct cohorts with 
sufficient number of observations. In our study, only cohorts with at least 50 youth have been 
considered for the construction of transition probability matrices, resulting in 579 cohorts for 
skill mismatch and 451 cohorts for skill and educational mismatch, respectively.  
To document movements into and out of job mismatch of employed youth, Table 5.1 
gives the transition probabilities of being job (mis)matched in year t given the youth cohort’s 
state in year t–1 for the pooled sample. As shown, job mismatch among employed youth 
appears to be a persistent phenomenon in Africa. However, three key differences can be 
observed between different types of (mis)matched youth cohorts. First, skill-matched cohorts 
have lower chances to remain well-matched after 2 years compared with youth cohorts with 
the required education level. In particular, the probability of a skill-matched cohort to remain 
well-matched is only 34.9%, compared with 41% for youth cohorts with the required education. 
Second, for all types of job mismatch, state dependence is more pronounced for educational 
mismatch than skill mismatch. For instance, year t’s overeducation risk among the 
overeducated in year t–1 is 4.4 percentage points higher than for overskilled and as much as 
                                                          
17 We constructed 5 birth generations using a 5-year interval: youth born between 1977 and 1981 (529 youth); 
between 1982 and 1986 (5,873 youth); between 1987 and 1991 (9,779 youth); between 1992 and 1996 (9,720 
youth); and between 1997 and 2000 (4,620 youth). 
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18.43 percentage points higher for undereducated than for underskilled. Finally, skill 
mismatched cohorts are more likely to transition to better job matches than youth cohorts with 
inadequate education. Youth cohorts who started off overskilled in year t–1 have 39.1% more 
chance of feeling well-matched in year t, and those who started off underskilled have 41.5% 
chance. These probabilities decline to 30% and 38.9% for overeducated and undereducated, 
respectively. 
Table 5.1: Transition probability matrices of youth cohorts by job mismatch status 
 Part 1: Skill mismatch status 
 Year t 
  Well-matched Overskilled Underskilled 
 
 
 
 Y
ea
r 
t-
1 
Well-matched 34.91 32.55 32.55 
Overskilled 39.08 27.59 33.33 
Underskilled 41.48 34.09 24.43 
     
 Part 2: Educational mismatch status 
 Year t 
  Well-matched Overeducated Undereducated  
  Y
ea
r 
t-
1 
Well-matched 41.03 24.36 34.62 
Overeducated 30.00 32.00 38.00 
Undereducated 38.86 18.29 42.86 
     
  
There are two potential explanations for these differential persistence rates between 
skill and educational mismatches. First, there might be more upward and downward rigidities18 
in mismatch status based on education than skills given that educational attainments and 
educational job requirements hardly change over a short period of time (2 years in the present 
study). In that context, over- or undereducated youth can only change their mismatch status by 
changing the job (Rubb, 2003; Frei and Sousa-Poza, 2012), which is particularly challenging 
in African countries where youth unemployment rate is often high and job mobility up the 
occupation ladder is low. In contrast, skill-mismatched youth can benefit from different 
training, financed by their employers or not, to bridge their skill deficits without necessarily 
being obliged to changing their job.  This argument is supported by our data: in 49.3% of the 
cases, skills improvement was the main focus of the training received by employed youth.  
Second, the observed differences in persistence of job mismatch might be the result of 
unobserved heterogeneity between skill and education-mismatched workers such as 
personality traits, ability, motivation and other unmeasured skills we do not control for and 
                                                          
18 Upward rigidity refers here to the transition from undereducation to job match and downward rigidity from 
overeducation to job match. 
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which could affect differently state dependence of skill and educational mismatches (Bauer, 
2002; Chevalier, 2003; Blázquez and Burdía, 2012).   
5.2. Skill and educational mismatches and the duration of unemployment spells 
An obvious question that has arisen from the previous analyses is why, despite all the potential 
negative effects of job mismatch (wages penalties, lower productivity, lower job satisfaction, 
psychological stress, etc.), youth would continue to accept jobs for which they are mismatched 
in terms of either skills or education. In this section, we test two potential explanations often 
advanced in the literature: African youth accept a mismatched job as a desperate measure rather 
than waiting longer in unemployment (the so-called scarring effect of unemployment) 
(Arulampalam, 2001; Meroni and Vera-Toscano, 2017) or as a strategy to gain experience and 
eventually increase their chances of getting better-matched jobs in the near future (the so-called 
stepping-stone hypothesis) (Sicherman and Galor, 1990).  
For first insights on the question, Table 5.2 reports the distribution of employed youth 
by job mismatch status for different durations of unemployment before accepting current job. 
It shows that the proportion of youth who accept a job that underutilizes their skills (i.e., they 
feel overskilled) or for which they are overeducated increases as they remain longer in 
unemployment up til about 6 months, before decreasing. In contrast, underskilled and 
undereducated youth behave differently: their proportion raises as their unemployment 
duration continues to increase. This preliminary result tends to confirm the scarring effect for 
underskilled and undereducated but a mix of both scarring effect and stepping-stone hypothesis 
for overskilled and overeducated youth, depending on the duration of their spell out of 
unemployment.  
 
Table 5.2: Distribution of employed youth by job mismatch status and duration of 
unemployment 
   Duration of unemployment before accepting current job (a) 
   [0;1w[ [1w;1m[ [1m;3m[ [3m;6m[ [6m;1y[ [1y;2y] >2y 
Jo
b 
m
at
ch
 
st
at
u
s 
 
Skill mismatch 
Well-matched 55.32 56.75 51.86 51.65 54 53.85 50.94 
Overskilled 17.34 19.35 20.39 17.69 20.62 19.81 16.24 
Underskilled 27.34 23.9 27.76 30.66 25.38 26.33 32.81 
 Observations 9,037 3,489 3,311 1,696 1,513 2,024 3,078 
 
Educational 
mismatch 
Well-matched 34.22 39.01 35.92 36.28 37.56 34.14 31.29 
Overeducated 7.33 8.76 9.38 11.74 11.23 9.95 7.97 
Undereducated 58.45 52.23 54.70 51.98 51.21 55.91 60.74 
  Observations 7,846 3,140 3,082 1,593 1,443 1,869 2,672 
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Note: (a) The letters w, m and y refer to week, month, and year, respectively.  
However, to go beyond these descriptive analyses and account for other factors that 
might explain the observed job mismatch status over various unemployment spells (such as 
personal and job characteristics), we estimate different probit models for each of the different 
mismatch outcomes and control for sample selection bias. We used the same set of variables 
as in our multinomial logit and selection models. Our key variable of interest is a categorical 
variable for the duration of unemployment before current job, taking the value 1 if the youth 
gets the job after less than a week of unemployment; 2 if unemployment duration was between 
1 week and 1 month; 3 if it was between 1 and 3 months; 4 if between 3 and 6 months; 5 if 
between 6 months and 1 year; 6 if between 1 and 2 years; and 7 if the youth spent more than 2 
years in unemployment before current job. Results from probit models corrected for sample 
selection bias are plotted in Figure 5.1 as average marginal effects on probabilities of being 
mismatched in the labor markets and in Table A.1 as coefficients of the probit models.  
Figure 5.1: Average marginal effects of duration of unemployment on job mismatch 
status (Estimates from Probit models corrected for sample selection bias) 
 
Focusing on mismatched workers, the graphs show for instance that the average 
marginal effect of accepting a job for which the youth is overskilled after less than a week in 
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unemployment rather than waiting longer is 0.03. This means that, after controlling for other 
characteristics, there is 3% more chance that youth who accepted a job after being unemployed 
for less than 1 week will be overskilled than for those who got a job after spending longer 
periods unemployed. For overeducated workers, the average marginal effects of getting a job 
in which they are overeducated increase as the duration in unemployment increases but decline 
after being unemployed between 6 months and 1 year, confirming our preliminary results. For 
these two categories of young workers, the fear of remaining unemployed initially pushes them 
to accept the job for which they are either overskilled or overeducated but, as they gain 
experience, they feel more comfortable looking for better matched jobs. In contrast, the average 
marginal effects of underskilled are by and large increasing as their unemployment experience 
persists, confirming the scarring effect hypothesis. A particularly interesting result concerns 
skill-matched youth who present negative average marginal effects. This means that the 
predicted probability of getting a skill-matched job diminishes as the youth are unemployed 
longer, probably because employers might perceive, rightly or wrongly, that their unused skills 
may have tapered off the longer the duration of their unemployment (Arulampalam, 2001).  
 
5.3. Accounting for countries and gender heterogeneities 
Labor market opportunities for youth are likely to be affected by general labor market 
conditions and changes prevailing in the country they live in. For instance, in some countries, 
legislators may make it difficult, or even illegal, to discriminate against workers based on 
gender while in others they may offer better incentives to firms hiring youth. In some others, 
labor markets might be thinner, more rigid (particularly in smaller economies) and labor 
mobility across regions low, which reduces job opportunities for newly graduated youth 
entering the labor markets and increases their likelihood of ending up in mismatched jobs. The 
existence in some countries of better social protection mechanisms and benefits such as 
unemployment insurance or pension schemes might also affect differently the behavior of both 
unemployed and employed youth. Finally, greater integration of some countries with the 
international economy might increase their vulnerabilities to global shocks and amplify their 
impact on domestic labor markets.  
To account for potential heterogeneity across countries and discrimination by gender, 
we replicate the analysis from the previous sections for each of the 10 selected African 
countries and estimate, separately by country and gender, the probabilities of youth being well 
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or mismatched in their respective labor markets. Figure 5.2 presents the estimated predicted 
probabilities by country and Figure 5 provides gender differences in the predicted probabilities 
of job mismatch using multinomial logit models. After controlling for personal and job 
characteristics, the predicted likelihood of being mismatched perfectly mirrors the descriptive 
analyses reported in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 5.2: Predicted probabilities of job mismatch by country 
 
Unsurprisingly, youth in larger economies (in terms of GDP)19, have a better chance of 
displaying the appropriate skills for their job. In Zambia and Egypt, for instance, employed 
youth have a 61.8% chance of being skill matched in their job compared with 44.7% in 
Tanzania and 43.4% in Madagascar. In addition, Egypt, the largest economy in the sample with 
the one of the best education systems in Africa20, has both the highest predicted probability of 
overskilled youth (36.7%) and the lowest probability of underskilled youth (1.4%). In contrast, 
the highest likelihood of underskilling is found in Madagascar (42.9%) and Benin (41.1%). In 
                                                          
19 During the time of the surveys (2012–2015), the average GDP (in constant 2010 USD) was USD 237.5 billion 
in Egypt; USD 39.8 billion in Tanzania; USD 24.6 billion in Zambia; USD 24.5 billion in Uganda; USD 13.8 billion 
in Congo; USD 9.3 billion in Madagascar; USD 8.2 billion in Benin; USD 8 billion in Malawi; USD 4.2 billion in 
Togo; and USD 2.5 billion in Liberia (World Bank, 2019). 
20 Egyptian universities are routinely classified among the best in Africa (see for instance the Shanghai ranking 
here: http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2019.html   
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terms of educational mismatch, Zambia (53.4%) and Egypt (52.2%) present the highest chances 
of having youth with the required education as well as the lowest risk of having undereducated 
employed youth (24.8 and 36.6%, respectively). Tanzania, which was among the worst 
performers in terms of predicted skill mismatch, now outperforms the remaining countries, 
with a 50.5% chance of having well- matched youth. On the other hand, Malawian employed 
youth are the least likely to be well-matched and most likely to be undereducated, all else being 
equal.   
One’s gender significantly affects the likelihood of having a job match in the selected 
countries, in contradiction with the human capital theory which postulates that only the 
supplied human capital of youth should matter in the labor markets. Figure 5.3 shows that there 
are important gender differences in the probability of being matched or not, the magnitude of 
the gap varying from one country to another and depending on the type of job mismatch 
considered. Egypt, for example, presents the largest gender gap among well-matched youth: 
after controlling for personal and job characteristics, an employed Egyptian male is 8.9% more 
likely to be skill-matched than a female, and 6.1% more likely to have the required education 
level. In contrast, female Egyptians are 7.9% and 2.9% more likely to be overskilled or 
overeducated, everything else held constant. In the majority of the surveyed countries, the 
predicted probabilities of being overskilled and overeducated are higher for females than males, 
with Zambia and Tanzania being relatively more gender-neutral when it comes to skill and 
educational mismatches, respectively.  
There are two potential explanations of the higher predicted probabilities of overskilling 
and overeducation among employed females. First, female labor market participation rates are 
lower than males’ in most African countries as women face discrimination in accessing the 
labor market due to cultural, religious, and institutional factors. In Egypt, for instance, less than 
20% of female youth aged 15–24 years old participated in the labor market during the survey 
period (2012–2015) compared with 48% for male youth. This means that women often have to 
work harder than males to increase their chances of finding a job and might then be more likely 
to accept jobs for which they are clearly overskilled or overeducated instead of remaining 
unemployed. Second, in line with Frank’s (1978) theory of differential overqualification, 
women may prioritize their male partners’ career success and job match instead of their own 
due either to men’s higher probability of better earnings or to their motherhood roles, leading 
them to willingly accept mismatched jobs. In addition, in most African countries, women 
generally follow their husbands or partners when they are relocated by their employers to other 
cities or regions. As Mincer (1978) put it perfectly, female partners then behave like “tied 
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movers” with employment outlooks that are probably better at their previous location, which 
increases the likelihood of ending up in overskilled or overeducated jobs. 
Figure 5.3: Gender differences in predicted probabilities of being job mismatched by 
country
 
5.4. Approximating economy-wide costs of job mismatch in Africa 
Estimation results from the previous sections suggest that job mismatch among African 
employed youth is not only persistent over time but also might have important efficiency 
implications by distorting the optimal allocation of resources and skills among the youth 
(Mavromaras et al., 2007). It is possible to make a rough estimation of the approximate overall 
costs to an economy of persistent skill and educational mismatches in Africa using results of 
wage penalties associated with labor market mismatches (overskilling, overeducation and 
underskilling)21. One way to do so is to combine the estimated wage penalties associated with 
job mismatch with the sample information on the number 𝑁 of mismatched workers in each 
                                                          
21 Given that being undereducated leads to a wage premium (see results from the Verdugo and Verdugo 
model), we only focus here on job mismatches leading with a wage penalty (Mavromaras et al., 2009). 
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country 𝑐. However, given that the distributions of skill and education mismatched workers 
overlap22, we reestimate the wage equation (9) separately for skill and educational mismatches.  
If productivity loss/gain of an employed youth due to job mismatch can be roughly 
approximated by the estimated coefficients from the wage equation, then the expected 
aggregate net value of productivity loss, ?̂?𝑇, conditional on being job-mismatched (𝑗 ≠ 3) and 
expressed in terms of wages of matched workers is  given by: 
 𝐸(?̂?𝑇|𝑗 ≠ 3)(W̅𝑚𝑘 𝑁𝑚𝑘 ) = ∑ ?̂?𝑜𝑘 (W̅o𝑘W̅𝑚𝑘 ∗ 𝑁o𝑘𝑁𝑚𝑘 ) + ?̂?𝑢𝑘 (W̅𝑢𝑠W̅𝑚𝑘 ∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑠𝑁𝑚𝑘 ) , 𝑘 = {𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}      (12) 
where the subscripts o and u refer to overskilling/overeducation and underskilling, 
respectively, depending on whether the skill mismatch (k=skill) or educational mismatch 
(k=education) model is considered.  ?̂? are the estimated coefficients from the wage effect 
models; W̅𝑚𝑘 ,  W̅o𝑘, and W̅𝑢𝑘 represent the average hourly wage received by matched, 
overskilled/overeducated and underskilled subgroups of employed youth and 𝑁𝑚𝑘 , 𝑁o𝑘, and 𝑁𝑢𝑘, 
their respective sample size, with 𝑁 = 𝑁𝑚𝑘 + 𝑁o𝑘 + 𝑁𝑢𝑘.  The first (second) term on the right-
hand side of equation (15) represents the approximate hourly aggregate cost of overskilling and 
overeducation (underskilling) as a percentage of hourly earnings of well-matched workers. The 
results of the computation are reported in Table 5.3 using the extended Verdugo and Verdugo 
model specification for the pooled sample controlling for country effects23. 
Estimation results show that the approximate hourly cost of overskilling is about 3.9% 
of hourly wages of skill-matched youth which, expressed in monetary terms, represents a 
monthly cost between USD 911,000 and USD 2.9 million for the whole sample24, or an average 
monthly cost of USD 1.9 million. Applying a similar estimation procedure, Mavromaras et al. 
(2009), found for instance that the overall cost of overskilling in Australia represents about 
2.6% of the country’s GDP. On the other hand, overeducation costs to the surveyed countries 
come to 3.2% of the wages of better-educated youth or a monthly average cost of USD 778,000. 
Putting together all the estimated costs associated with job mismatch, the overall cost is roughly 
equal to 9.3% of hourly earnings of well-matched workers or around USD 3.7 million per 
month. However, as explained by Haskel and Martin (1996) and Dearden et al. (2006), the 
magnitude of these economy-wide costs of job mismatch estimated using wage penalties may 
                                                          
22 See Figure 2. 
23 We omit the results at the country level because many coefficients of job mismatch variables were not 
statistically significant. 
24 Under the assumption that employed youth worked 8 hours per day, 6 days per week, for 30 days a month.  
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be underestimating the true penalties associated with job mismatch given that we are not 
controlling for key factors affecting firm productivity (inputs such as capital and raw materials, 
or union and firm market power)25. Our estimations should then be interpreted as an 
approximate lower bound of the aggregate effects of job mismatch in the selected African 
countries.  
 
Table 5.3: Approximated productivity gain/loss due to job mismatches in Africa 
 Skill mismatch    Educational 
mismatch 
Overall cost 
 Over-skilling Under-skilling Total  Overeducation  ?̂?𝒌  -0.171  
[-0.260; -0.083] 
(0.044)*** 
-0.052  
[-0.165; 0.060] 
(0.057) 
-  -0.152  
[-0.264; -0.040]  
(0.056)*** 
 
?̅?𝒌?̅?𝒎𝒌  0.702 0.774   0.904  𝑵𝒌𝑵𝒎𝒌  0.327 0.538   0.238  𝑬(?̂?𝒄|𝒋 ≠ 𝟑)(?̅?𝒎𝒌 𝑵𝒎𝒌 ) -0.039 [-0.060; -0.019] -0.022  [-0.069;0.025] -0.061 [-0.128;0.006]  -0.032  [-0.057; -0.008] -0.093  [-0.185; -0.002] 
Note: The estimated coefficients ?̂?𝑘  are derived from the IV-2SLS method corrected for sample selection bias 
on the pooled sample of employed youth (see section 3.2.1). [] stands for the 95% confidence interval. (***) 
refers to significance at 1% level. Bootstrapped standard errors (with 10,000 replications) into brackets. Source: 
Authors’ computations. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper examined the incidence and the effects of skill and educational mismatches among 
employed youth (aged 15–29) in 10 African countries, namely Benin, Congo, Egypt, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia surveyed between 2012 and 2015. 
In particular, the paper investigated whether, after controlling for personal and job 
characteristics, skill and educational mismatches have significant effects on youth’s wages, 
their job satisfaction and their likelihood of job search. In addition, the paper shed light on the 
persistence of job mismatch over time and the existence of country and gender heterogeneities 
                                                          
25 The surveys did not collect data on physical output and inputs of the firms employing the youth.   
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in the risk of being job mismatched, as well as the approximate economy-wide costs of skill 
and educational mismatches in Africa. 
Our findings revealed that over 17.5% of employed youth felt overskilled in their 
current job and 28.9% experienced important skill deficits when performing their work-related 
duties. Overskilling was more pervasive in Egypt (36.6%) and Tanzania (24.3%) whereas 
underskilling was is important in Madagascar (42.5%) and Benin (41.0%). In contrast to 
findings in developed countries, our results showed that a larger share of employed youth in 
African countries worked in jobs for which they were undereducated (56.9%) than 
overeducated (8.3%), with significant cross-country differences. Moreover, our results 
established that, contrary to the assumption of the assignment theory, educational mismatch is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for skill mismatch because a non-negligible share 
of over- and undereducated youth perceived their skills as being appropriate to perform their 
current job.  
A number of methods were used to estimate the wage effects of skill and educational 
mismatches in Africa. Applying an IV-2SLS method accounting for sample selection bias, 
results from the Heckman-corrected Mincerian earning equations strongly rejected the 
hypotheses from the human capital and job competition theories that job mismatch is not 
irrelevant for wage determination of employed youth. In particular, the average wage penalty 
associated with overskilling and overeducation was estimated at 6.7% and 17.9%, respectively, 
whereas undereducation was associated with a wage premium of 44.8% using an extended 
Verdugo and Verdugo model.  
Our results from the IV ordered Probit model corrected for sample selection bias 
supported the predictions from the relative deprivation theory as skill and educational 
mismatches were found to damage youth’s perceptions of their job satisfaction. Overskilled 
and underskilled youth have respectively 3.4% and 1.8% less chance of feeling satisfied in their 
current work compared with youth possessing the appropriate skills, consistent with empirical 
evidence (Green and Zhu; 2008; Amador et al., 2012; Allen and van der Velden, 2001; 
McGuinness and Sloane, 2011; Sánchez-Sánchez and McGuinness, 2015). Overskilled youth 
are probably less satisfied with their jobs as they might foresee little career opportunities, feel 
that their skills are not optimally leveraged or might fear that their unused skills could 
depreciate over time. On the other hand, the pressure and the need to regularly keep up with 
the skill requirements of a job and the constant fear of losing a job due to skill insufficiency 
might affect the perceived satisfaction of underskilled youth.  
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The paper also highlighted the behavioral consequences of skill and educational 
mismatches of employed youth as the findings suggested that mismatched youth were more 
likely to search for alternative jobs to replace their current job than their peers who are better 
matched. One additional year of overeducation was estimated to have increased by 0.18% the 
likelihood of seeking alternative jobs while overskilled youth were 0.31% more likely to apply 
for other jobs to replace their current job. By contrast, undereducated youth were found to be 
less likely to search for alternative jobs either because they might feel they were lucky to be 
employed in spite of their educational deficits or because they might offset their formal 
educational handicap with specialized vocational and on-the-job training. 
Using a pseudo-panel approach, we also tested the predictions of the job search and job 
matching theories that job mismatch among African youth is a transitory phenomenon. Our 
estimated transition probability matrices indicated that job mismatch is rather persistent for 
employed youth as skill- and education-matched youth cohorts had, respectively, only a 34.9% 
and 41% chance of remaining well matched after 2 years. Mismatch state dependence was 
found to be more severe for educational than skill mismatch, as evidenced by the 4.4 percentage 
point gap between the probabilities of staying overeducated and overskilled during the survey 
period. Finally, being skill mismatched was found to offer more chances to transition toward 
better job match than lacking the required education level. Specifically, youth cohorts who 
were either over- or underskilled in the initial surveys had, respectively, 39.1% and 41.5% 
chance of feeling well-matched in the follow-up surveys, against 30% for overeducated and 
38.9% for undereducated, respectively. The paper discussed potential explanations of these 
differential persistence rates between skill- and education-mismatched youth cohorts in terms 
of rigidities to changes in educational attainments and educational job requirements but also 
the existence of potential unaccounted for and unobserved heterogeneity (related to personality 
traits, ability or motivation). 
Further insights were also given on the scarring effect and stepping-stone hypothesis as 
potential explanations of why African youth might accept jobs for which they are mismatched, 
with different results depending on the type of job mismatch analyzed. For instance, our 
findings confirmed the scarring effect hypothesis of underskilled youth, implying that they had 
probably accepted a mismatched job as a desperate measure instead of waiting longer in 
unemployment for a better job match. Overeducated and overskilled youth were found to 
display a dual behavior: for shorter spells of unemployment (between 6 months and 1 year), 
they were willing to accept a job for which they were overskilled or overeducated instead of 
remaining unemployed (scarring effect hypothesis). However, beyond that period, they started 
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looking for better matched jobs as they had gained experience, the mismatched job having only 
served as a springboard (stepping stone hypothesis).  
The findings of this paper have important policy implications given the magnitude of 
skill and educational mismatches, its adverse effects at both the individual level (wage penalty, 
low job satisfaction and labor productivity) and aggregate level, and its persistence over time. 
First, African countries must develop policies that clearly facilitate school-to-work transition 
of their youth. The surveys revealed indeed that the overwhelming majority (around 97%) of 
youth (employed or not) did not receive any kind of advice from job search agencies or the 
government to find a job. The most common obstacles to finding a job that they faced were 
high educational criteria, lack of professional experience, unavailability of jobs and lack of 
knowledge on how to look for a job. Governments need therefore to implement structures that 
facilitate easy access to information on job availability as well as provide incentives (such as 
tax reduction or subsidy schemes) to encourage firms to offer internships and apprenticeships 
to youth graduates. In countries where these structures already exist, their efficiency and 
efficacy should be improved, their mandates better defined, their existence better advertised 
and their performance better monitored.  
Second, despite significant strides being made by many African countries to improve 
access to education, there is still ample room for improvement as too many youth, especially 
females and those living in rural areas, have yet to benefit from better national education 
systems. The surveys showed that 38% and 11.5% of employed youth never attended school 
for economic reasons or because there was no school nearby, thereby missing the opportunity 
to improve their human capital. Investment in soft and hard infrastructure (construction of new 
schools, renovation of old ones, modern school equipment, better teachers’ working conditions, 
ICT infrastructure, etc.) will therefore be crucial to increase the chances of these youth getting 
better-matched jobs. Abolition of school fees to accelerate universal access to primary 
education, better control of education costs at secondary and tertiary education levels, and the 
generalization of scholarships would have a positive impact on education outcomes.  
Finally, countries should aim at diversifying the range of skills/education available for 
the youth as one of the recurrent complaints from employers is the impossibility of finding very 
specialized skills on the continent for sectors such as robotics, information and computer 
technology (ICT), automation, (advanced) engineering, etc. In particular, STEM (science, 
technology, engineering and math) skills as well as social, system, complex problem-solving 
and critical thinking skills are often lacking among recent graduates; only 6.1% of surveyed 
youth followed STEM curricula. Countries can achieve this objective by making their 
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education systems more demand-driven to address the observed persistent mismatch in the 
labor markets. This will also increase the relevance and attractiveness of education for the 
youth as 38.2% of surveyed youth considered that their education was not useful in finding 
jobs. Countries can for instance institutionalize forums where education/training institutions 
and firms can “speak to each other” and establish sectoral skill strategies that identify the range 
of skills needed by different economic sectors. In that way, education institutions can adapt 
their curricula to the requirements and needs of the labor markets and firms can be sure to fill 
their vacancies with skilled workers without having to import them from overseas. A forward-
looking approach should however guide this process, to account for the constant changing 
dynamics of the labor markets, and anticipate the skills needed for the future. 
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Appendices 
Figure A.1. Gender gaps in the incidence of skill and educational mismatches in selected 
African countries 
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Note: Gender gaps refer to the difference between the shares of employed males and females by mismatch group in each country. Positive values imply that
the share of employed males is higher than females' for the mismatch group considered.
Source: Authors' computation based on ILO's STWT data, various countries and years
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Table A.1: Probability of being job matched given the duration of unemployment before 
current job (Probit model corrected for sample selection bias) 
 Duration of unemployment Coeff. (std. err.)  
1. Being skill-matched [0;1w[ -0.268 ( 0.092)*** 
[1w;1m[ -0.266 (0.094)*** 
[1m;3m[ -0.473 (0.094)*** 
[3m;6m[ -0.515 (0.097)*** 
[6m;1y[ -0.432 (0.098)*** 
[1y;2y] -0.450 (0.096)*** 
>2y -0.467  (0.095)*** 
   
2. Being overskilled [0;1w[ 0.171 (0.097)* 
[1w;1m[ 0.160 (0.099) 
[1m;3m[ 0.252 (0.099)** 
[3m;6m[ 0.193 (0.104)* 
[6m;1y[ 0.311 (0.104)*** 
[1y;2y] 0.283 (0.102)*** 
>2y 0.155 (0.101) 
   
3. Being underskilled [0;1w[ 0.135 (0.148) 
[1w;1m[ 0.133 (0.149) 
[1m;3m[ 0.326 (0.150)** 
[3m;6m[ 0.420 (0.152)*** 
[6m;1y[ 0.220 (0.153) 
[1y;2y] 0.253 (0.151)* 
>2y 0.384 (0.150)** 
   
4. Being education-matched [0;1w[ 0.049 (0.089) 
[1w;1m[ 0.052 (0.092) 
[1m;3m[ 0.016 (0.092) 
[3m;6m[ 0.018 (0.095) 
[6m;1y[ 0.068 (0.096) 
[1y;2y] -0.002 (0.095) 
>2y -0.013 (0.093) 
   
5. Being overeducated [0;1w[ 0.424 (0.172)** 
[1w;1m[ 0.413 (0.175)** 
[1m;3m[ 0.463 (0.175)*** 
[3m;6m[ 0.522 (0.180)*** 
[6m;1y[ 0.590 (0.181)*** 
[1y;2y] 0.546 (0.181)*** 
>2y 0.280 (0.179) 
   
6. Being undereducated [0;1w[ -0.299 (0.091)*** 
[1w;1m[ -0.295 (0.093)*** 
[1m;3m[ -0.270 (0.094)*** 
[3m;6m[ -0.322 (0.097)*** 
[6m;1y[ -0.386 (0.099)*** 
[1y;2y] -0.267 (0.097)*** 
>2y -0.169 (0.094)* 
Note: [0;1w[: Less than a week of unemployment before getting current job; [1w;1m[:  unemployment duration between 1 week and 1 
month; [1m;3m[: Between 1 and 3 months; [3m;6m[: Between 3 and 6 months; [6m;1y[: Between 6 months and 1 year; [1y;2y]: Between 1 
and 2 years; >2y: More than 2 years in unemployment before current job. Robust standard errors in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) refer to 
statistically significant coefficients at least at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
